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Extradition Controversies: How Enthusiastic 
Prosecutions Can Lead to International 
Incidents 
INTRODUCTION 
The well-publicized Ira Einhorn story and other recent extradition 
cases highlight how the United States' ("U.S.") zeal to bring U.S. 
murder suspects to justice in America has collided with issues of human 
rights and state sovereignty.] In some instances the attempts at extra-
dition have escalated into international confrontations.2 In the Einhorn 
case, on December 4,1997, a French Appeals Court denied extradition 
to the U.S. of Ira Einhorn, a famous "hippie" guru and convicted 
murderer. 3 The outrage felt in the U.S. after the French Court's deci-
sion is symptomatic of the escalating frustration that U.S. law enforce-
ment officials and politicians have faced in the last two decades as high 
visibility international murder prosecutions have run into delays or 
have been defeated by foreign courts' refusals to extradite the suspects 
back to the U.S.4 The Appeals Court's decision caused one of Einhorn's 
French attorneys to gloat, "The United States has learned today to its 
distress that it still has lessons to learn from old Europe in matters of 
human rights."5 
The combination of complicated extradition and human rights prin-
ciples and the unique facts of the murder cases has resulted in heated 
disputes between the U.S. and countries which have traditionally been 
1 See Michael Shea, Expanding Judicial Scrutiny of Human Rights in Extraditing Cases After 
Soering, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 85, 104 (1992); Sharon Williams, Extradition and the Death Penalty 
Except in in Canada: Resoh'ing the Ng and Kindler Cases, 13 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMPo LJ. 799, 
800-01 (1991); Steven Le~y, Getting Away With it, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 15, 1997. References to an 
extradition "case" mean the entire chain of events leading to the controversy. When referring to 
a specific legal case, the cite to the court reporter will follow unless the reference is based on 
another author's analysis of the case. In such cases, the cite to the author's law review note or 
article will follow. 
2 See David M. Kennedy et aI., The Extradition of Mohammed Hamadei, 31 HARV. INT'L LJ. 5, 6 
(1990); Gregory Kane, Israel Should Rethinh Extradition Refusal, BALT. SUN, Oct. 12, 1997, at lB. 
3 See Levy, supra note 1. 
4 See Shea, supra note 1; Williams, supra note 1; Levy, supra note l. 
5 Fred Hiatt, No, We're Not Gloating, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 1997, at C07. 
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staunch U.S. allies.6 The extreme facts of the murder cases have caused 
the U.S. to react angrily, and even, on occasion, to explicitly pressure 
the other country to return the suspects.7 For instance, Ira Einhorn 
was convicted in the U.S. of bludgeoning his girlfriend to death and 
then hiding her body in a steamer trunk in his apartment for eighteen 
months.8 Einhorn was arrested in 1979 for the murder, but he fled the 
U.S. on the eve of his trial, which led to a sixteen-year, five-country 
manhunt by the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office before French 
authorities ultimately captured Einhorn in Champagne-Mouton, 
France.9 The French Appeals Court that heard the case freed Einhorn, 
allowing him to resume his life in a quaint village in France. lO 
Another such incident occurred after the 1985 hijacking of a TWA 
flight en route to Rome from Athens. 11 The hijackers killed a U.S. Navy 
diver in front of television cameras and severely beat a number of 
American citizens.12 German officials managed to capture one of the 
suspects, Mohammed Hamadei, in Frankfurt, years after the incident 
and the U.S. immediately requested his extraditionP In response, a 
group of kidnappers believed to be affiliated with the terrorist group 
Hezbollah kidnapped two German nationals in Beirut and demanded 
that the German government release Hamadei in exchange for the 
hostages.14 Germany was faced with the unenviable prospect of choos-
ing among three outcomes: deeply offending the U.S., bowing to 
international terrorists, or letting two of its citizens die. 15 
A more recent extradition controversy involved a suspected mur-
derer who fled to Israel and claimed dual citizenship, hoping that 
Israel would refuse to extradite him under an Israeli non-extradition 
of nationals law. 16 The suspect, Samuel Sheinbein, is suspected of 
killing, dismembering and then burning an acquaintance in Mary-
land. 17 When Israel delayed the requested extradition to consider the 
6 See Kenriedy, supra note 2; Levy, supra note 1. 
7 See Levy, supra note 1, at 58; Jerusalem Rethinks US. Extradition Rejitsal, LONDON GUARDIAN, 
Oct. 2, 1997, at 014. 
8 See Levy, supra note 1, at 58. 
9 See Steve Lopez, The Search for the Unicorn, TIME, Sept. 29, 1997, at 48. 
10 See Levy, supra note 1, at 58-59. 
II See Kennedy, supra note 2, at 5. 
12 See id. at 8. 
13 See id. at 5. 
14 See id. at 6. 
15 See id. at 10. 
16 See Kane, supra note 2, at lB. 
17 See id. 
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case, the Chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Appropria-
tions Committee threatened to link the continuance of U.S. aid to 
Israel on Sheinbein's return. IS 
In 1997, the same year as the Sheinbein incident, another Ameri-
can murder suspect tried to use a dual citizenship argument to stave 
off extradition from France. 19 A California psychologist named James 
Nivette allegedly shot his girlfriend to death and then abandoned the 
couple's I8-month old toddler on the way to the airport as he fled the 
scene.20 Nivette was arrested without a struggle in the French town of 
Munster, but U.S. authorities feared that a prosecution in the U.S. was 
in doubt because France, like Israel, typically does not extradite its own 
citizens. 21 
Part I of this note provides an overview of extradition law. This 
section also analyzes how exceptions and safeguards have been created 
to make the practice fundamentally fairer for the suspect. Part II of 
this note considers how a recent expansion of international human 
rights litigation has affected the U.S.'s efforts to extradite murder 
suspects. This section also analyzes possible future implications that 
international human rights will have on extradition requests by the 
U.S. Part III explores possible alternate means the U.S. can use to 
obtain suspects from other countries. Part IV of this note recounts 
recent cases where delays in high visibility international murder prose-
cutions have caused international incidents. This note concludes that, 
given the recent complications that state sovereignty and international 
human rights have presented for American law enforcement officials, 
the U.S. will increasingly turn to informal rendition in the future to 
gain jurisdiction over murder suspects. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF EXTRADITION LAW 
The most straightforward definition of extradition is "a process by 
which one country surrenders, for purposes of trial or punishment, 
individuals accused of crimes committed outside its borders to the 
nation in which the alleged crimes were committed or where the act 
has produced detrimental effects."22 In order for the U.S. to prosecute 
18 See Jerusalem Rethinks US Extradition Rejilsal, slljml note 7, at 014. 
19 See Mareva Brmm & Nigel Hatton, Hunt For Fugitive Ends, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 21, 1997, 
at AI. 
20 See id. 
21 See id. 
22 Barbara Banoff, To Surrender Political Offenders: The Political Offense Exception In United States 
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a defendant, a court must have both jurisdiction over the subject 
matter and jurisdiction over the person.23 Therefore, before the U.S. 
requests extradition from another country, the appropriate authorities 
must determine whether the conduct was committed within the terri-
tory of the U.S., or whether the conduct, even though committed 
outside of U.S. borders, produced detrimental effects within the U.S.24 
Mter subject matter jurisdiction has been established, the prosecutors 
try to establish personal jurisdiction over the suspect by successful 
extradition back to a U.S. court.25 Although it might make sense for 
countries to return fugitives to the prosecuting country to face justice, 
international law imposes no legal obligation upon a country to extra-
dite an individua1.26 Theoretically, each state has the right to grant 
immunity from prosecution to a fugitive as long as that person is within 
the state's territorial jurisdiction.27 However, most states voluntarily ac-
cept a limitation on their sovereignty because they recognize the im-
portance of international cooperation in prosecuting serious crimes. 28 
Over the years, the willingness of countries to accept limitations on 
their state sovereignty has stemmed from four purposes which provide 
the theoretical foundation for international extradition: (l) to obtain 
reciprocal return offugitive offenders; (2) to facilitate the punishment 
of wrongful conduct, and thereby promote justice; (3) to avoid harbor-
ing within their borders those who may commit offenses similar to 
those which they are accused of committing in another jurisdiction; 
and (4) to avoid international tensions caused by one country's refusal 
to return a particularly sought-after accused offender.29 
The U.S., like most common law countries, will neither ask nor allow 
the extradition of a fugitive without a treaty which imposes an obliga-
tion on the parties to surrender the fugitive. 30 As of 1997, the U.S. had 
negotiated and ratified over one hundred bilateral treaties with other 
countries, but had not enacted a substantive U.S. law.31 The only U.S. 
Law, 16 N.Y.UJ. INT'L L. & POL. 169, 173 (1984); Barbara Sicalides, RICO, CCE, and International 
Extradition, 62 TEMP. L. REv. 1281, 1291 (1989). 
23 See Sicalides, supra note 22, at 1291. 
24 See id. 
25 See id. 
26 See id. 
27 See id. 
28 See Sicalides, supra note 22, at 1291. 
29 See Banoff, supra note 22, at 173-74. 
30 See Sicalides, supra note 22, at 1292. 
31 See Banoff, supra note 22, at 175. 
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federal law on extradition, 18 U.S.C. § 3184, deals primarily with pro-
cedure, leaving the substantive rights of individuals facing extradition 
up to the various bilateral treaties. 32 In general, the U.S. treaties are 
based on the theory of reciprocity.33 Under that theory, the United 
States and the other signatory country grant an extradition request 
only in exchange for the extradition or promise of future extradition 
of an individual it seeks from the requesting country.34 
A. Requirements of Extradition Law 
In most common law jurisdictions, including the U.S., a formal 
extradition request must be presented to the executive branch. 35 The 
executive remains the ultimate authority to extradite, although the 
judiciary branch certifies that the crimes charged fall under the appli-
cable treaties' provisions.36 In practice, the U.S. Secretary of State 
renders the final decision to extradite the suspect after a reviewing 
court certifies that sufficient evidence exists linking the accused to the 
crime.37 
One of the reasons why U.S. officials react so strongly when another 
country's judiciary refuses extradition due to perceived human rights 
violations is because U.S. courts typically have refused to inquire into 
the possibility of unfair treatment by a requesting country.38 Under the 
U.S.'s conception of international extradition, allowing a court to 
inquire into the practices of other countries would impermissably 
infringe on principles of state sovereignty and reciprocity.39 Regardless 
of whether the requested country is a civil or common law country, the 
principle of extraterritoriality is the most basic limitation on extradi-
tion.40 The principle of extraterritoriality concerns the right of nations 
to control activity within their borders.41 The respect for the territorial 
32 See id. 
33 See Kai Rebane, Extmdition and Individual Rights: The Need F01' an International Criminal 
Court to Safeguard Individual Rights, 19 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1636, 1649 (l996). 
34 See id. at 1649-50. 
35 See id. at 1650. 
36 See id. 
37 See id. at 1650-5l. 
38 See Lauren Wolfe, Gill & Sandhull. 11lIundi: Due Process and Judicial Inquiry Into Potential 
Mistreatment of Extraditees Uy Requesting Conn tries, 13 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMPo LJ. 1009, 1011 
(1991). 
39 See id. at 102l. 
40 See Rebane, supra note 33, at 1646. 
41 See id. 
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sovereignty of other nations has always been a basic tenet of interna-
tional law and serves as the foundation for the various requirements 
of extradition law.42 
Extradition law mandates that a number of requirements be met by 
the official request, or the requested country is under no obligation to 
turn over the suspect.43 In both civil and common law countries the 
requirements of extradition demand that the alleged crime must con-
stitute an extraditable offense.44 The applicable treaty generally con-
tains a list of offenses which were considered extraditable at the time 
the treaty was signed.45 The treaty usually either specifies that the list 
is exhaustive, or establishes a degree of punishment for which an 
offense becomes extraditable.46 The rationales for listing possible ex-
traditable offenses are "first, to avoid extradition for minor offenses, 
and second, to prevent the embarrassment of both nations if the 
requested state should decline surrender of the fugitive because the 
conduct does not constitute criminal conduct in that state. "47 
Another requirement of extradition is that the offense at issue be a 
double criminality crime.48 The double criminality doctrine mandates 
that conduct is not extraditable unless it is a crime under the laws of 
both the requested and the requesting state.49 The basic premise of 
double criminality is that nations are equal in their powers of self-de-
termination and are guaranteed the right to forbid a requesting coun-
try from punishing a fugitive for conduct not considered a crime under 
the laws of the requested state.50 Despite the strong undertones of state 
sovereignty in the theory of double criminality, the alleged offense 
does not have to bear the same name or criminal definition in both 
countries.51 For instance, in one case involving double criminality, the 
Canadian government granted extradition to the U.S. of a woman 
42 See id. 
43 See Sicalides, supra note 22, at 1295-97. 
44 See id. at 1295. 
45 See id. 
46 See id. Extradition treaties usually contain a list of specific crimes for which extradition will 
be granted, a clause covering the extradition of nationals, a clause pertaining to various rights 
safeguards, and a political offense exception. See Rebane, supra note 33, at 1650. 
47 See Sicalides, supra note 22, at 1295. 
48 See Rebane, supra note 33, at 1652. 
49 See Sicalides, supra note 22, at 1296. 
50 See id. at 1297. 
51 See id. at 1299. 
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whose act constituted murder under California law but only amounted 
to manslaughter under Canadian law.52 
The speciality doctrine provides another limitation on extraditable 
offenses.53 The requirement of speciality prevents the extraditing coun-
try from prosecuting an individual for offenses other than those for 
which the extradition was sought.54 International law scholars have 
identified five rationales for the speciality principle: (l) the requested 
state could have refused extradition for an offense other than that 
upon which the request was based; (2) the requested nation's surren-
der of the fugitive provides the requesting state with the in personam 
jurisdiction required; (3) the prosecution or punishment by the re-
questing country would be impossible without the requested country's 
surrender of the person; (4) use of the requested state's processes to 
effectuate the surrender of an individual for an offense other than 
those present in the extradition request would constitute an abuse of 
a formal process; and (5) the requested nation relies upon the repre-
sentations of the requesting nation in using its process.55 
B. Exceptions to Extradition Requests 
A requesting country may fulfill all of the requirements of an extra-
dition request, yet extradition will still be denied if the request falls 
under one of the exceptions to extradition.56 The most complicated 
exception to extradition is the political offense doctrine.57 The political 
offense exception has three underlying purposes: (l) to recognize the 
legitimacy of political dissent; (2) to guarantee the rights of the ac-
cused; and (3) to protect the interests of both the requesting and the 
asylum nations.58 The U.S. and all of the signatories of its .treaties will 
not extradite a person accused of certain political offenses.59 However, 
none of the treaties define "political offense," and courts have been 
left to fill in the blanks.60 In general, the courts of the U.S. and Europe 
52 Seeln re United States & Smith [1984] 15 C.C.C.3d 16 (Can.). 
53 See Rebane, supra note 33, at 1652-53. 
54 See id. at 1652. 
55See Sicalides, supra note 22, at 1299-1300. 
56 See id. at 1300. The applicable exceptions are the political offense exceptions and the death 
penalty exception. See id. 
57 See id. 
58 See Rebane, supra note 33, at 1653. 
59 Banoff, supra note 22, at 177-78. 
60 See Sicalides, supra note 22, at 1301. 
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have divided the political offense doctrine into two categories: pure 
political crimes and relative political crimes.61 
A pure political crime is subversive toward a particular government 
but does not directly damage property or people.52 Such crimes usually 
involve treason, espionage, and sedition.53 These types of crimes have 
almost exclusively been left out of extradition treaties.64 
Relative political crimes involve the commission of a common crime 
in connection with a political act or event.65 The definition of a relative 
political crime has pt<esented courts with numerous difficulties because 
the judges must determine whether the crime is a political crime or a 
non-political crime if the offense is enumerated in the treaty.66 The 
muddled attempts to define a political offense exception to extradition 
stem from differing attitudes toward the underlying conduct of the 
political crime and concerns about the fairness of the judicial process 
in the requesting country.57 
Another exception to V.S. extradition requests that has been raised 
with greater frequency in the last two decades is the death penalty 
exception.68 In any extradition request, the laws of the requested state 
are controlling; if the requested state has prohibited the death penalty, 
it has the right to refuse or to condition the surrender of the suspect.69 
Typically, in a case where a suspect is charged with a capital crime the 
requested state will seek sufficient assurances that the state or the V.S. 
government will not seek the death penalty.70 Most countries hold the 
view that it is improper to ask a state to use its legal system to facilitate 
an extradition which may result in a practice which is repugnant to its 
values, laws and public policy.71 
61 See Banoff, supra note 22, at 178. 
62 See id. 
63 See id. 
64 See id. 
65 See id. 
66 See Banoff, supra note 22, at 178. 
67 See id. at 179. The labor of recounting the numerous attempts at defining a relative political 
act is outside of the scope of this note, but it suffices to say that the efforts have been "a 
hodgepodge collection of principles often dictated by political events and changing circum-
stances." [d. 
68 See Sicalides, supra note 22, at 1303. 
69 See id. 
70 See id. For instance, the U.S.'s extradition treaties with Great Britian, Canada, and Israel 
provide that the requested party has the right to seek sufficient assurances that the death penalty 
will not be carried out in the particular case. [d. 
71 See id. 
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II. AN INJECTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
Three recent cases involving U.S. extradition requests for suspects 
charged with capital crimes underscore the tensions involved when the 
United States requests extradition from countries that prohibit the 
death penalty. A global trend toward abolition of the death penalty and 
a rise in recognition of international human rights have tremendously 
complicated extradition law.72 The cases of Soering, United States v. 
Kindler and United States v. Ng exemplifY the effects of these trends. 73 
A. The Soering Case 
One of the most famous cases of international extradition law in-
volved a West German national namedJens Soering who murdered his 
girlfriend's parents in Virginia on March 30, 1985.74 Soering met with 
his girlfriend's parents in their home in Boonsboro, Virginia, to discuss 
the couple's relationship.75 An argument ensued and Soering attacked 
the parents with a knife, slit their throats, and fled to Great Britain 
with his girlfriend.76 Mter Soering was arrested in Great Britain for 
cheque fraud, a grand jury in Virginia indicted him for capital murder 
based on his admission of guilt and evidence of premeditation.77 
Great Britain has banned the death penalty for all but certain of-
fenses, and this is reflected in the U.S.-Great Britain treaty which states: 
If the offense for which extradition is requested is punishable 
by death under the relevant law of the requesting Party, but 
the relevant law of the requested Party does not provide for 
the death penalty in a similar case, extradition may be refused 
unless the requesting party gives assurances satisfactory to the 
requested party that the death penalty will not be carried 
out. 7S 
Concurrent with the U.S. request, West Germany filed an extradition 
request citing non-capital murder charges.79 When Virginia requested 
72 See Craig Roecks, Extradition, Human Rights, and the Death Penalty: When Nations Must Refuse 
to Extradite a Person Charged with a Capital Crime, 25 CAL. W. INT'L LJ. 189, 230-31 (1994). 
73 See Williams, supra note 1, at 800-08. 
74 See Shea, supra note 1, at 104; Soering, 161 Em. Ct. H.R. (ser.A) at 11 (1989). 
75 See Shea, supra note 1, at 104. 
76 See id. 
77 See Roecks, supra note 72, at 19B. 
78Id. at 234 n.58. 
79 See id. at 199. 
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Soering's extradition, the British Secretary of State requested that the 
death penalty not be imposed in the case.80 The Virginia County Attor-
ney certified that his office would make a representation of Great 
Britain's request to the judge during sentencing, and Britain's Secre-
tary of State signed off on the extradition request.81 The House of 
Lords later upheld the Secretary of State's decision.82 
Soering responded by appealing the decision to the European Com-
mission on Human Rights ("ECHR").83 Soering made three arguments 
before the ECHR: (1) extradition would expose him to the death row 
phenomenon, that is, prolonged uncertainty during the appeals proc-
ess combined with severe conditions of confinement amounting to 
inhuman or degrading treatment; (2) extradition would violate the 
guarantees of a fair trial contained in the European Convention on 
Human Rights; and (3) extradition by Great Britain would violate 
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.84 The ECHR 
unanimously held that there would be a violation of Article 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights if Great Britain effectuated 
the extradition.85 The ECHR based its holding on the following circum-
stances particular to Soering's case: (1) Soering's age and mental con-
dition; (2) if extradited, Soering would spend six to eight years in 
post-sentence detention in harsh conditions which would cause men-
tal anguish; and (3) the legitimate purposes of extradition could be 
achieved by other means (the German extradition requests).86 The 
ECHR denied that its holding gave extraterritorial effect to the Euro-
pean Convention by stating that the decision established Convention 
obligations only on Great Britain, which was a party to the Conven-
tion.87 
The actual effect of the ECHR's decision on Soering's case was not 
substantial because the British Foreign Secretary ultimately extradited 
the suspect after receiving "concrete" assurances that Virginia would 
not seek the death penalty.88 However, the ECHR's decision presented 
the prospect that European courts could abandon the principle of 
80 See id. at 198. 
8l See id. at 198-99. 
82 See Williams, supra note 1, at 813. 
83 See Roecks, supra note 72, at 199; Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1. 
84 See Shea, supra note 1, at 105; Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 30-31. 
85 See Williams, supra note 1, at 814; Soeting, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35. 
86 See Williams, supra note 1, at 814; Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35. 
87 See Shea, supra note 1, at 107. 
88 See id. at 112. 
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non-inquiry and conduct their own examinations of the human rights 
record of requesting states.S9 The decision also validated the practice 
of courts in civil law countries undertaking meaningful review of the 
requesting countries' extradition petitions and possibly expanding the 
review to include the requesting countries' human rights practices. gO 
B. The Kindler and Ng Cases 
In 1991, the Canadian Supreme Court was faced with extradition 
requests from the U.S. for two suspects wanted for capital crimes.9) The 
two cases were reminiscent of Soering because Canada had abolished 
the death penalty in 1976.92 In addition, Canada's 1976 treaty with the 
U.S. provided that: 
When the offense for which extradition is requested is pun-
ishable by death under the laws of the requesting State and 
the laws of the requested State do not permit such punish-
ment for the offense, extradition may be refused unless the 
requesting State provides such assurances as the requesting 
State considers sufficient that the death penalty will not be 
imposed, or, if imposed, shall not be executed.93 
In 1983, the state of Pennsylvania sentenced John Kindler to death 
for first degree murder, criminal conspiracy, and kidnapping.94 How-
ever, Kindler escaped from custody in 1984 and successfully evaded 
capture until he crossed the Canadian border in 1985.95 The same year, 
the state of California charged Charles Ng with twelve counts of mur-
der, two counts of conspiracy to commit murder, three counts of 
kidnapping, and one count of burglary; Ng also escaped and was finally 
apprehended in Canada.96 The Canadian government extradited both 
men without seeking any assurances from the U.S. government that 
the death penalty would not be implemented.97 The Soering decision 
89 See id. at 111. 
90 See Rebane, supra note 33, at 1651. 
91 See Shea, supra note 1, at 114; Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice) 2 S.C.R. 779 (1991) 
(Can.); Re Ng Extradition, 2 S.C.R. 858 (1991) (Can.). 
92 See Williams, supra note 1, at 819. 
93 See Shea, supra note 1, at 138 n.164. 
94 See Williams, supra note 1, at 799-800; Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Kindler, 639 F.2d 
1,2(1993). 
95 See Williams, supra note 1, at 800. 
96 See id. 
97 See Shea, supra note 1, at 115. 
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was not controlling on the Kindler and Ngcases because Canada is not 
a member of the European Convention and therefore, Soering had only 
persuasive value on the Canadian Supreme Court.98 However, human 
rights became an important aspect of the Court's decisions because, 
with the abolition of the death penalty in Canada, the Canadian Su-
preme Court had to decide whether the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms, which forbade certain types of punishment, could be 
given extraterritorial effect.99 
In both cases, the Canadian Supreme Court held that it was neither 
a violation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms nor a 
violation of Canada's international obligations to send Kindler and Ng 
back to the U.S.IOO Both Kindler and Ng appealed the decisions to the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee ("UNHRC"), but Kindler 
was extradited back to the U.S. before his case was heard.!01 Neverthe-
less, in Kindler's case, the UNHRC distinguished the facts from Soering 
and held that Canada did not breach any human rights principles by 
releasing Kindler without obtaining assurances.!o2 The UNHRC first 
decided that prolonged judicial proceedings and prolonged periods of 
detention under a death row atmosphere are not per se violations of 
prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment or inhuman and 
degrading treatment. 103 The UNHRC noted that the facts and circum-
stances of each case must be taken into account before any determi-
nation can be reached. 104 In distinguishing Kindler from Soering, the 
UNHRC pointed out that the age and mental state of the offenders 
differed. 105 Another deciding factor was that Kindler had not intro-
duced evidence concerning possible inhumane conditions in Pennsyl-
vania's prisons. JOG The UNHRC also stated that the case would have 
come out differently if Canada had decided arbitrarily or summarily 
to send Kindler to the U .S.107 
98 See Williams, supra note 1, at 808. 
99 See id. at 817-18. 
100 See Roecks, supra note 72, at 208-13; Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice) 2 S.C.R. 779 
(1991); Re Ng Extradition, 2 S.C.R. 858 (1991) (Can.). 
101 See id. at 208-10; Kindler v. Canada, Communication No.470/1991, reprinted in 14 Hum. 
Rts. L.J. 307 (1993). 
102 See Roecks, supra note 72, at 210. 
103 See id. at 210-11. 
104 See id. at 211. 
105 See id. 
106 See id. 
107 See id. at 212; Kindler. 14 HUM. RTS. LJ. 22 at 314. 
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Interestingly, the UNHRC reached the opposite conclusion in the 
Ngcase. The UNHRC distinguished Ngfrom Kindler by remarking that 
Ng was extradited pending a trial, and that California's sole means of 
execution was cyanide asphyxiation, as opposed to lethal injection as 
it was in Pennsylvania. lOS The UNHRC decided that when imposing 
capital punishment, the execution must be "carried out in such a way 
as to cause the least possible mental and physical suffering. "109 There 
was uncontested evidence presented during the hearing that death by 
cyanide asphyxiation may cause prolonged suffering and agony, and 
take as long as ten minutes to work.IIO 
C. Possible Future Implications oj Human Rights on U.S. Extradition 
Requests 
The combination of a global trend to abolish the death penalty and 
growing obligations on requested states to assess the requesting state's 
penal system after the Soering line of cases will continue to frustrate 
U.S. interests in uncomplicated extraditions. III International law schol-
ars have identified two aspects of the death penalty as areas especially 
likely to cause human rights litigation after a U.S. extradition request 
for a capital crime: the death row phenomenon and alleged racially 
disparate sentencing practices in the U.S.112 In the Soering case, the 
ECHR concluded that the death row phenomenon violated the Euro-
pean Convention.1I3 The court decided that Soering would have to wait 
six to eight years for his execution, subject to the mental suffering of 
death row.1l4 There is no reason to believe that the process of death 
penalty litigation will be accelerated in the future, so the death row 
phenomenon will likely continue to playa role in extradition requests 
to European nations. IE; In addition, there seems to be enough proof of 
disparate sentencing practices in the U.S. to raise a potentially success-
ful equal protection claim relying on international human rights. ll6 
lOR Roecks, supra note 72, at 213-14; Ng v. Canada, Communication No. 469/1991, U.N. 
Doc.CCPR/C/ 49/D/469/ 1991. 
I09Roecks, supra note 72, at 214; Ng v. Canada, Communication No. 469/1991, supra note 108, 
at' 16.4. 
110 See Roecks, supra note 72, at 214. 
III See id. at 230. 
112 See id. at 220-29. 
113 See id. at 198-200; Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (sec A) at 35. 
114 See Roecks, supra note 72, at 198-200 
mSee id. 
116 See id. at 220-23. 
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A handful of studies conducted in the early 1990s came to the 
conclusion that the capital sentencing practices in the U.S. are racially 
discriminatory against African Americans. ll7 For instance, a study of 
the sentencing practices under the federal "drug kingpin law" revealed 
that, of those cases in which the death penalty was sought, 78% of the 
defendants were African American, even though approximately 75% 
of all capital and non-capital drug traffickers were white. lls In addition, 
a study found that African Americans who murdered caucasians were 
sentenced to death at twenty-two times the rate of African Americans 
who killed African Americans. 119 Given these studies, and given the fact 
that the UNHRC often relies on statistics to make decisions, it is 
probable that the UNHRC or another international body will decide 
that to extradite an African American to the U.S. for capital murder 
will offend equal protection principles. 120 
The prospect of having a foreign court assess and pass judgment on 
its penal system is especially galling for the U.S. because of the Ameri-
can judicial conception of non-inquiry. 121 U.S. courts have traditionally 
decided that it is inappropriate to inquire into the nature of other 
countries' procedures during extradition hearings. 122 For instance, in 
Holmes v. Laird the District of Columbia Court of Appeals noted the 
"impropriety" of assessing and reviewing other countries' procedures 
with regard to crimes committed in that country. 123 Perhaps the Ameri-
can indignation after the Einhorn decision can be explained by the 
frustration of watching foreign courts pass judgment on our constitu-
tional rights, which we hold to be the most liberal in the world. 
Nonetheless, the doctrine developed through the Soering line of cases, 
which authorized a fact specific inquiry of the U.S. legal system, will 
continue to lend an air of unpredictability to U.S. requests for extra-
dition of murderers. 124 To say the least, a fact-specific review of U.S. 
extradition requests will severely encumber the U.S. law enforcement 
objectives of swift and uncomplicated extraditions of murderers. 125 
117 See id. at 223-24. 
\l8 See id. at 223. 
\l9 See Roecks, supra note 72, at 224. 
120 See id. at 228-31. 
121 See Wolfe, supra note 38, at 1022. 
122 See id. 
123 See id. at 1039 n.124; Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
124 See Roecks, supra note 72, at 231-32. 
125 See id. 
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III. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE MEANS THE U.S. CAN USE TO OBTAIN 
SUSPECTS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES 
If the requested country refuses to extradite the fugitive, or the U.S. 
foresees a possible problem, there are still a number of options other 
than the formal extradition process. 126 These alternative means are 
referred to as irregular rendition, and fall into three categories. 127 The 
first is the abduction of an individual by agents of the requesting 
country.128 The second is the informal surrender of an individual by 
the requested country to the requesting country without formal or 
legal process.129 The informal surrender of an individual by the re-
quested country can and has involved abduction of the suspect by 
agents of the requested country in cooperation with the requesting 
country.130 The last category of informal rendition is when the re-
quested country uses its immigration laws to turn over the suspect to 
the requesting country.131 
The latter two categories of informal rendition usually involve a 
measure of cooperation between U.S. law enforcement agents and 
those of the requested country.132 For example, if the requested gov-
ernment has a policy of refusing to extradite its own citizens, or the 
U.S. government feels that the requested state will protect the offender 
or allow him to escape, U.S. officials will try to work out an informal 
surrender of the suspect between the respective law enforcement agen-
cies, either in the foreign country or on U.S. soil. I33 Although the 
kidnapping and unsupervised police coordination employed in infor-
mal rendition have the potential for abuses of human rights, surpris-
ingly, U.S. courts have generally not inquired into potential mistreat-
ment of informal extraditees by U.S. or foreign officials. 134 
126 See Ethan Nadelmann, The Evolution of United States Involvement in the International Rendi-
tion of Fugitive Criminals, 25 N.Y.U.]. INT'L L. & POL. 813, 813-14 (1993). 
127 See Rebane, supra note 33, at 1656. 
128 See id. 
129 See id. 
130 See id. at 1656-57. 
131 See id. 
132 See Edmund McAlister, The Hydrolic Pressure of Vengeance: United States v. Alvarez-Machain 
and the Casefor aJustified Abduction, 43 DEPAUL L. REv. 449, 474 (1994). 
133 See id. 
134 See id. at 478-79. 
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A. The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine 
In Ker v. Illinois, the U.S. Supreme Court was presented with a case 
involving the legality of an extraterritorial abduction. 135 The defendant, 
while living in Peru, was indicted by the state of Illinois for embezzle-
ment and larceny.136 The governor of Illinois requested that the U.S. 
State Department issue a warrant for Ker's return, pursuant to the 
extradition treaty between the U.S. and Peru.137 The U.S. government 
issued the warrant and authorized an agent to serve the warrant on 
the Peruvian government and receive the suspect in return. 13H But, 
instead of following the agreement, the agent forcibly abducted the 
defendant and placed him aboard a ship bound for the U .S.139 Illinois 
subsequently tried and convicted the defendant. 140 
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the defendant's forc-
ible abduction was not a sufficient reason for him not to answer when 
brought within the jurisdiction of the Court, which had the right to 
try him for such an offense. 141 In other words, forcible abduction does 
not deprive a court of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 142 
This basic rule was later upheld in Frisbie v. Collins, where the defen-
dant contended that his forcible abduction from Illinois to Michigan 
to stand trial violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 143 The Supreme Court held that: 
[T] he power of a court to try a person for a crime is not 
impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the 
court's jurisdiction by reason of a forcible abduction. Due 
process of law is satisfied when one present is convicted of a 
crime after having been apprised of the charges against him, 
and after a fair trial in accordance with constitutional proce-
dural safeguards. 144 
135 See id.; Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 436 (1886). 
136 See McAlister, supra note 132, at 477; Kn; 119 U.s. at 437. 
137 See McAlister, supra note 132, at 477; Ker, 119 U.S. at 438. 
138 See McAlister, supra note 132, at 477. 
139 See id. 
140 See id. at 477-78. 
\41 See id. at 478; Ker, 119 U.S. at 444. 
142 See McAlister, supra note 132, at 478. 
143 See id; Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 519 (1952). 
144 Frisme, 342 U.S. at 522; McAlister, supra note 132, at 478-79. 
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Over the years, the Ker-Frisbie doctrine has blossomed into a general 
rule that U.S. courts will impose virtually no restrictions on how U.S. 
officials obtain custody over fugitives. 145 However, some district courts 
have been willing to apply narrow exceptions to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine 
based on a violation of the applicable extradition treaty or a violation 
of the defendant's due process rights. 146 
The most famous example of an exception based on a treaty viola-
tion, is the case of Alvarez-Machain, which involved a unique set of 
facts. 147 In February 1985, a U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") 
agent named Kiki Camarena was kidnapped, tortured, and murdered 
in Guadalajara, Mexico. 148 Camerena had been investigating a multi-
million dollar drug smuggling syndicate in nearby Jalisco, Mexico. 149 
On March 5, 1985, Mexican officials discovered the bodies of 
Camerena and a Mexican pilot who had aided in the investigation on 
the side of a secluded road in the Mexican countryside. 150 The hands 
and feet of both bodies were securely bound, and an autopsy revealed 
that Camerena had been brutally beaten in the face and skull with a 
blunt object.]fil Camerena suffered multiple jaw and skull fractures and, 
in addition, his rectal cavity had been violated by a foreign object. 152 A 
massive five year investigation was launched which ultimately led to the 
indictment of twenty-two suspects for the abduction, torture, and mur-
der of Camerena.153 
One of the indictees was Dr. Alvarez-Machain, a gynecologist, whom 
the DEA suspected of assisting in Camerena's murder by keeping him 
alive during the torture in an effort to obtain more information. 154 In 
December 1989, through a paid informant, DEA agents began a series 
of negotiations with officials from the Mexican FederalJudicial Police 
("MFJP") for the informal surrender of Alvarez-Machain. 155 It was later 
reported that the MFJP told Agent Berrellez, the DEA representative, 
that the Mexican Attorney General had granted his full support to the 
145 See Nadelmann, supra note 126, at 859. 
146 See McAlister, supra note 132, at 481. 
147 See Charles Siegel, Individual Rights Under Self-Executing Extradition Treaties-Dr. Alvarez.-
Machain's Case, 13 Loy. LA. INT'L & COMPo LJ. 759, 765-66. (1991). 
148 See id. at 766. 
149 See McAlister, supra note 132, at 489. 
150 See id. at 490. 
151 See id. 
152 See id. 
153 See Siegel, supra note 147, at 769-70. 
154 See id. at 770. 
155 See McAlister, supra note 132, at 496. 
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informal surrender, but that the Mexican government preferred to 
keep the arrangements secret in an effort to avoid any public reac-
tion.156 In order to facilitate the deal, Agent Berrellez told the MFJP 
that his authorization came from the Los Angeles division of the DEA 
and from the Deputy Director in Washington D.C.157 Agent Berrellez 
later testified that the DEA approved the abduction and that he be-
lieved the office of the U.S. Attorney General had been involved in the 
plans as well.15s The negotiations culminated in a deal that required 
the DEA to pay the Mexican officials a $50,000 reward, plus cover the 
expenses of transporting Alvarez-Machain to the U.S.159 On April 2, 
1990, Alvarez-Machain was abducted from his office in Guadalajara by 
a group of men and transported by car to Leon, Mexico. 160 Alvarez-
Machain claimed that during the abduction he was hit in the stomach 
and shocked through the soles of his shoes by an electric shock appa-
ratus.161 In addition, he complained that he was injected with a sub-
stance that made him feel light-headed.162 A small plane transported 
Alvarez-Machain from Leon to EI Paso, Texas, where DEA agents were 
waiting for him at the airport. 163 
The Mexican government responded to the abduction by presenting 
a series of diplomatic notes to the U.S. State Department which re-
quested a detailed report on U.S. participation in the scheme and 
charged that the abduction violated the U.S.-Mexico extradition 
treaty.164 The Mexican government also demanded both that Alvarez-
Machain be returned and that the agents in charge of the abduction 
stand trial in Mexico for their crimes.165 
Alvarez-Machain filed a motion in district court arguing that the 
court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because he was forcibly 
abducted in violation of his due process rights, and because the abduc-
tion violated the extradition treaty between the U.S. and Mexico. 166 The 
156 See id. at 497. 
157 See Siegel, supra note 147, at 771. 
158 See id. 
159 See id. 
160 See id. 
161 See id. 
162 See Siegel, supra note 147, at 771. 
163 See id. 
164 See id. at 772. 
165 See id. 
166 See McAlister, supra note 132, at 498; United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F.Supp. 599, 599 
(C.D. Cal. 1990) (discussing the indictment of A1varez-Machain). 
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court relied on the Ker-Frisbie line of cases and rejected Alvarez-
Machain's due process attack on the court's personal jurisdiction over 
him.167 However, the court did find that the U.S. violated the mutual 
extradition treaty because the suspect had been abducted from Mexi-
can territory and because Mexico protested the abduction. 168 The court 
decided that the diplomatic notes served on the u.s. State Department 
constituted an official protest by the Mexican government, and that 
the protest was sufficient to grant Alvarez-Machain derivative standing 
to invoke Mexico's rights under the treaty.169 The court reasoned that 
the u.S. was responsible for the abduction since the men who carried 
it out were paid U.S. agents, and therefore the abduction constituted 
a violation of the extradition treaty.l70 The district court ordered the 
immediate repatriation of Alvarez-Machain back to Mexico. 171 
The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's finding, but the U.S. 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the case.172 The Court held, 
in an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, that the extradition 
treaty did not explicitly forbid a unilateral abduction and that neither 
the language nor the history of the treaty supported an implied pro-
hibition on acquiring jurisdiction outside of its terms. 173 Mter finding 
that the kidnapping did not violate the terms of the treaty, the court 
applied the Ker-Frisbie doctrine and overruled the lower court's deci-
sion by holding that Alvarez-Machain could stand trial in the U.S.174 
A case providing a possible exception to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine was 
United States v. Toscanino, which involved the kidnapping of a suspect 
from U ruguay.175 A Uruguayan police officer, alleged to be working for 
the u.S. government, abducted the suspect from Uruguay and brought 
him to Brazil.l 76 The suspect claimed that police tortured him in Brazil 
for seventeen days with at least "tacit approval" from U.S. agents. 177 
Brazilian authorities sent the suspect to New York where he was tried 
167 See McAlister. supra note 132. at 498; Cam·Quintero. 745 F. Supp. at 604-06. 
168 See McAlister. supra note 132. at 498; Caro-Quintero. 745 F. Supp. at 609. 
169 See McAlister. supra note 132. at 498; Cam·Quintero. 745 F. Supp. at 608-09. 
170 See McAlister. supra note 132. at 498; Caro-Quintero. 745 F. Supp. at 609. 
171 See McAlister. supra note 132. at 499. 
172See United States v. Alvarez-Machain. 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir.1991) (per curiam). rer.!'d 508 
U.S. 655 (1992). 
173 See United States v. Alvarez-Machain. 508 U.S. 655. 656-63 (1992). 
174 See Alvarez-Machain. 508 U.S. at 668-70. 
175 See 500 F.2d 267. 267 (2d Cir. 1974); McAlister. supra note 132 at 482. 
176 See McAlister; supra note 132. at 482. 
177 See id. 
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and convicted on drug charges.178 The suspect's appeal eventually 
made its way to the Second Circuit, where the court examined whether 
or not a federal court could assume jurisdiction over a suspect who was 
illegally and forcibly abducted by U.S. government agents.179 
The Second Circuit began by questioning the validity of the Ker-Fris-
bie doctrine after the Supreme Court decisions in criminal due process 
cases such as Rochin v. California and Mapp v. Ohio. ISO The court found 
that the Ker-Frisbie doctrine could no longer bar judicial inquiry into 
how the defendant was brought before the court. 181 Not surprisingly, 
once the court examined the type of government conduct in the case, 
it found that there had been a due process violation. 182 The opinion 
stated, "[w]e view due process as now requiring a court to divest itself 
of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant where it had been 
required as the result of the government's deliberate, unnecessary, and 
unreasonable invasion of the accused's constitutional rights."183 The 
court's decision to deny jurisdiction over Toscanino seemed to give 
future extradited defendants a plausible argument to deny a court's 
personal jurisdiction over them, if they could prove deliberate, repre-
hensible government conduct in their abduction. 
In summary, under the exceptions to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, a 
defendant who was abducted and forcibly brought to the U.S. could 
argue that the kidnapping violated either the extradition treaty or his 
due process rights. 184 It is unclear how much legal weight a court will 
grant either the district court's or the Ninth Circuit's decision in 
Alvarez-Machain after the Supreme Court's ultimate decision in the 
case.185 Given the majority's opinion, it seems that a defendant will have 
to locate a provision in the applicable extradition treaty which forbids 
bilateral or unilateral abduction before a favorable return will be 
granted on an argument which relies on a violation to rescind personal 
jurisdiction.186 As for a due process argument, international law schol-
ars have labeled the Toscanino decision an "anomaly to the United 
178 See id. 
179 See id; Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 271. 
180 See McAlister, supra note 132, at 482-83; Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275; Rochin v. California, 
342 U.S. 165 (1952); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
181 See McAlister, supra note 132, at 482-83; Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275. 
182 See McAlister, supra note 132, at 482-83. 
183 [d. 
184 See id. at 479-84. 
185 See id. at 498-500. 
186 See id. 
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States judiciary's otherwise uniform application of the Ker-Frisbie doc-
trine."187 Not one single U.S. court has subsequently used the Toscanino 
test and concluded that the government's action was so outrageous as 
to eviscerate jurisdiction. 188 Because of the U.S. judiciary's refusal to 
disavow the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, U.S. law enforcement officials have 
increasingly turned to abduction as a viable alternative to traditional 
extradition.189 If formal extradition is not achievable because of a hu-
man rights conflict, or because the requested country refuses to extra-
dite its nationals, it would seem that the only obstacles to abduction 
for the U.S. are the foreign relations implications. 19o 
B. Current Cases and Controversies Involving United States Extradition 
Requests 
1. Ira Einhorn 
The case which epitomizes the U.S.'s recent frustration with inter-
national extradition is that of Ira Einhorn. 191 Einhorn was a well-known 
"hippie" leader in Philadelphia during the 1960s, who managed to 
garner enough mainstream support to run for Mayor of Philadel-
phia.192 What the citizens of Philadelphia did not know was that Ein-
horn had a history of domineering and sometimes violent relationships 
with his girlfriends. 193 During the 1960s, there were two episodes in 
which Einhorn attacked women who had rejected him.194 In one inci-
dent he hit a woman over the head with a Coke bottle, and in the other 
instance he strangled a woman until she fell unconscious. 195 He even 
wrote in his journal after the Coke bottle assault, "violence always 
marks the end of a relationship."196 
These violent episodes were unknown to Holly Maddux when she 
moved into Einhorn's apartment in 1972.197 Over the next five years, 
however, Maddux personally witnessed Einhorn's dark side, and by 
187 McAlister, supra note 132, at 484. 
188 See id. 
189 See id. at 485. 
190 See id. at 484-86; see also supra text accompanying note 188. 
191 See U.S. Murderer Resumes Life, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Dec. 6, 1997, at A31. 
192 See Levy, supra note 1, at 59. 
193 See id. 
194 See id. 
195 See id. 
1961d. 
197 See Levy, supra note 1, at 59. 
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1977 she had decided to leave him permanently.198 Einhorn received 
the news of the breakup by phone at his apartment and threatened to 
throw all of her belongings into the street. 199 Maddux reportedly raced 
over to Einhorn's apartment soon after the phone call.20o The two of 
them were seen at a movie together the next evening, and that was the 
last time anybody saw Holly Maddux alive.201 A Drexel University stu-
dent who lived below Einhorn was later interviewed by police and 
recalled hearing a blood curdling scream and heavy banging one night 
during that Fall of 1977.202 A few nights after the movie, two teenage 
girls confessed to police that Einhorn had asked them to help him 
dump a heavy trunk into the Schuykill River. 203 Over the next few 
months, Einhorn spent a semester at the Kennedy School of Govern-
ment in Cambridge, Massachusetts.204 During this time the neighbors 
living below Einhorn's apartment back in Philadelphia complained to 
police about a putrid smell and leaking fluid coming from Einhorn's 
apartment. 205 During this period, Einhorn refused to let the janitor or 
his landlord into a padlocked closet next to his bed.206 On March 28, 
1979, Philadelphia homicide detectives entered the apartment while 
Einhorn was present, pried open the closet with a crowbar, and sprang 
the lock of a steamer trunk they found inside.207 Maddux's mummified 
body, shrunken to 37 pounds since her disappearance in 1977, was 
quickly discovered.208 Maddux's skull had been fractured in at least six 
places by trauma from a blunt object. 209 
Einhorn first tried to claim that Maddux's body was planted in his 
closet by the KGB in an effort to discredit him.210 When he realized 
that this defense was not going to be successful, Einhorn began to 
make plans to flee the country.211 A ridiculously low bail of $40,000, of 
which he only had to put up $4,000 in cash, allowed him to flee to 
198 See Lopez, supra note 9, at 48. 
199 See id. 
200 See id; Levy, supra note I, at 59. 
201 See Levy, supra note I, at 59. 
202 See Lopez, supra note 9, at 48. 
203 See Levy, supra note I, at 59. 
204 See id. 
205 See id. 
206 See Lopez, supra note 9, at 48. 
207 See id. 
208 See id. 
209 See id. 
210 See Levy, supra note I, at 59. 
211 See id. 
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Ireland in 1981.212 He took the name of Ben Moore and disappeared 
for a number of years.213 
Shortly after Einhorn's flight, Richard DiBenedetto, the assistant 
D.A. in Philadelphia in charge of fugitives and extraditions, began a 
manhunt for Einhorn which eventually stretched across five countries 
and consumed the better part of sixteen years.214 DiBenedetto relied 
heavily on volumes from Einhorn's diaries, which revealed a sadistic 
side to Einhorn that few of his followers would have believed.215 The 
diaries contained the following phrases: "sadism sounds nice-run it 
over your tongue-contemplate with joy the pains of others. To beat a 
woman-what joy. "216 
The closest international law enforcement officials came to catching 
Einhorn during his sixteen year odyssey was in Ireland, when a Trinity 
College professor familiar with the story confronted Einhorn in the 
Trinity cafeteria.217 Einhorn insisted his name was Ben Moore and by 
the time Irish police arrived, Einhorn had disappeared once again.218 
During those sixteen years, Maddux's father committed suicide and 
her mother died from natural causes.219 Maddux's sister remarked that 
Holly's murder "ruined their life [sic]. And they died thinking Ira beat 
them."22o 
In 1993, Philadelphia D.A. Lynne Abraham decided to try Einhorn 
in absentia because she feared that any available witnesses would vanish 
by the time he could be brought back to the U.S.221 The legislature had 
just passed a law which allowed trials in absentia and the jury took just 
two hours to convict Einhorn.222 Subsequent to the conviction, the 
Philadelphia D.A.'s office continued to search for Einhorn.223 In 1997, 
a former backer of Einhorn called DiBenedetto with information that 
a woman named Anika Flodin would lead authorities to Einhorn.224 
Using international law enforcement resources, DiBenedetto was able 
212 See id. 
213 See id. 
214 See Lopez, supra note 9, at 48. 
215 See id. 
216Id. 
217 See id. 
218 See id. 
219 See Lopez, supra note 9, at 48. 
220Id. 
221 See id. 
222 See id. 
223 See id. 
224 See Lopez, supra note 9, at 48. 
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to find Flodin's social security number.225 The tip paid off when Flodin 
applied for a French driver's license using a Mallon, France address. 226 
OnJune 13, 1997, Einhorn was arrested without a fight at the Mallon, 
France farmhouse which he shared with his new wife, Anika Flodin.227 
Dominique Tricaud, a flamboyant French attorney, was hired by 
Einhorn to represent him in the extradition proceedings. Tricaud 
claimed that he had never lost an extradition hearing before he took 
Einhorn's case.228 Tricaud decided to build his defense of Einhorn 
around the Philadelphia D.A.'s decision to try the suspect in absentia 
in 1993.229 He told Time that "the French will not send a man back to 
a barbaric country where he was tried without being present to defend 
himself. "230 
The legal argument which Tricaud made before the French Appeals 
Court was simple, ifnot entirely true. 231 He argued that trying Einhorn 
in absentia offended principles of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights and, more importantly, French legal principles, which 
guarantee a new trial after capture for a suspect convicted in absen-
tia. 232 Tricaud's imagination came into play when he warned the 
French judges that if Einhorn was extradited he would be put to death, 
with no chance to defend himself.233 (Einhorn had been sentenced to 
life in prison, not the death penalty.) Many of the U.S. press in the 
courtroom felt that the underlying purpose of the argument made to 
the judges was to send a message to the "barbarians across the Atlan-
tic."234 In the face of the Tricaud assault, the French Prosecutor, Jeanne 
Pierre Defose du Rau, calmly told the Justices that the trial in absentia 
should not affect the extradition request made by the U.S.235 Einhorn's 
lawyers responded by remarking that America imposes the death pen-
alty on mental defectives and children.23G The French Court of Appeals 
did not explain its decision, which was to free Einhorn, but it is 
225 See id. 
226 See id. 
227 See id. 
228 See id. 
229 See Levy, supra note 1, at 60. 
230 Lopez, supra note 9, at 48. 
231 See id. 
232 See id. 
233 See id. 
234 See Levy, supra note 1, at 60. 
235 See id. 
236 See id. 
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plausible that the justices may have bought into Tricaud's "send a 
message to America" appellate strategy. 237 
American outrage after the verdict was not tempered by a French 
judge's decision to place Einhorn under investigation for breaking 
immigration laws.238 American reporters, following Einhorn as he lei-
surely shopped at an outdoor market, composed headlines for their 
articles such as "U.S. MURDERER RESUMES LIFE."239 Newsweek in-
sinuated that the "prickliness" often displayed by French waiters may 
have manifested itself through the patriotic invocations of human 
rights ideals that probably prompted the decision.240 Joel Rosen, the 
D.A. who actually tried Einhorn in absentia, may have summed up 
American sentiment best when he remarked that it was infuriating that 
a foreign court would deny the U.S. custody of "an American citizen 
who killed another American citizen on American soil. "241 The case was 
appealed, but the Philadelphia D.A. 's office was not optimistic about 
the outcome.242 
Instead of relying on French justice, the Pennsylvania legislature 
promptly passed an amendment in January of 1997 which allows for 
new trials under certain conditions for people sentenced in absentia.243 
French authorities re-arrested Einhorn in September of 1997, and the 
U.S. made a second request that he be extradited.244 At the extradition 
hearing in Bordeaux, Einhorn's attorneys argued that the Pennsylvania 
legislature could not undo the outcome of a court trial by legislatively 
granting a new trial,245 The French prosecutor who represented the 
U.S. government countered by arguing that even if the law is poten-
tially invalid, the Frenchjudges are not competent to verify the legality 
or constitutionality of an American law and therefore Einhorn must 
be extradited.246 The French Appeals court agreed to extradite Ein-
horn, but on the conditions that he be tried again in Philadelphia, and 
that the death penalty could not be applied if he is convicted.247 
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However, the court allowed Einhorn to remain at liberty pending 
further court action, raising the possibility of another flight from jus-
tice. 248 One of his lawyers, Dominique Delthil, refused to guarantee that 
Einhorn would stay in France but remarked that Einhorn has no 
intention of leaving the area.249 
Despite Einhorn's liberty, Holly Maddux's sister rejoiced in the de-
cision, saying, "He is about to come face to face with the consequences 
of his actions. "250 Delthil has plans to appeal the case to France's 
highest court, the Court of Cessation; if the decision is upheld, he will 
request a review by the government of Prime Minister Lionel Jospin.251 
According to Delthil, it will be another two years before the fate of Ira 
Einhorn is finally decided. 252 
2. James Dewayne Nivette 
Also in 1997, France and the United States were involved in another 
murder extradition.253 Authorities in Folsom, California wanted James 
DeWayne Nivette for the murder of Gina Barnett, his live-in girl-
friend. 254 He fled the United States to an apartment his family owned 
in Munster, France.255 
Nivette had lived with Barnett and their eighteen month old son for 
a number of years in a condominium in Folsom, California.256 Two 
months before the murder, Barnett decided to leave Nivette and move 
into the home of a new boyfriend.257 During this period, she took out 
a restraining order against Nivette, who had a history of battering his 
wives and girlfriends dating back to 1988.258 
After Barnett moved out, Nivette threatened either to take custody 
of their son or to cut off financial support. Nivette and Barnett finally 
signed an agreement stating that Nivette would continue coverage for 
their son on Nivette's life and medical insurance policies, and in return 
248 See id. 
249 See id. 
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Barnett would drop the restraining order. 259 Before receiving the re-
straining order against Nivette, Barnett had told police that she feared 
that he would shoot her.260 The restraining order was dismissed by a 
court on November 10, 1997; police allege that six days later Nivette 
shot Barnett thirteen times as she tried to flee his condominium.261 
The couple's son was found sobbing and dressed only in his pajamas 
in a Bay Area industrial park near the San Francisco airport.262 Appar-
ently, Nivette had abandoned the toddler in his haste to flee the 
country.263 Mter finding Nivette's car parked at the San Francisco 
airport, the FBI launched an international investigation and discov-
ered from one of Nivette's acquaintances that his family owned a flat 
in Munster, France.264 On November 21, 1997, French police arrested 
Nivette after a neighbor reported that she had seen him in his flat. 265 
The Nivette extradition request by the Sacramento County prosecutors 
was complicated by two issues which Nivette raised: (1) Nivette claimed 
French citizenship because his father was born in France (the French 
will not extradite a national) and (2) France will not extradite a pris-
oner to a country where the person will face the death penalty.266 
The Sacramento prosecutors responded to Nivette's arguments by 
filing a backup request to have him tried in France on the California 
charges and by promising not to seek the death penalty in the case.267 
Lee Brown, a deputy D.A. in Sacramento, remarked that his office 
never intended to seek the death penalty because Nivette's case lacked 
the special circumstances (e.g., the use of poison, kidnapping or tor-
ture) needed to justifY a request for the death penalty.268 Nevertheless, 
the Sacramento D.A. 's office sent a formal assurance to French authori-
ties that the death penalty would not be imposed even if later evidence 
pointed to special circumstances in the case.2m 
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On January 29, 1997, the French Appeals Court at Colmar, France, 
ordered the extradition of Nivette to Sacramento.270 Despite the Ap-
peals Court victory, the case was far from over. Nivette's attorney, 
Dominique Bergmann, filed an appeal charging that Nivette will face 
life imprisonment without possibility of parole, which is not condoned 
in France.271 Bergmann also threatened to file an appeal to the ECHR 
ifhis argument was rejected in France.272 Deputy D.A. Brown countered 
the appeal by arguing that the maximum sentence Nivette faced was 
thirty-five years to life in prison, with the possibility of parole after 
twenty-eight to thirty years.273 In June of 1998, the French Supreme 
Court upheld the lower court's decision that Nivette should be extra-
dited back to California.274 True to his word, Bergmann filed a claim 
with the ECHR that Nivette's extradition would violate his human 
rights since France does not allow the death penalty.275 Bergmann is 
purportedly concerned that if the District Attorney were to leave office 
for any reason, her successor would not be bound by the agreement 
not to seek the death penalty. 276 As of December of 1998, the timetable 
for a possible hearing was unknown.277 
3. Mohammed Hamadei 
A 1985 extradition request for a well known Middle Eastern terrorist 
emphasized the international political implications of zealous U.S. law 
enforcement efforts to bring criminals to justice.278 On June 14, 1985, 
TWA flight 847, en route from Rome to Athens, was hijacked by Arab 
terrorists and forced to fly to Beirut airport.279 During the hijacking, 
the terrorists shot and killed U.S. Navy diver Robert Stethem and 
severely beat a number of the other American passengers. 280 A total of 
thirty-nine passengers were held hostage for seventeen days before the 
terrorists were able to escape to Beirut.281 On January 13, 1987, one of 
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the accused hijackers, Mohammed Hamadei, was arrested at the Frank-
furt, West Germany airport carrying a fake passport and a suitcase 
stocked with liquid explosives.282 The U.S. had previously indicted 
Hamadei and three other men in the District Court for the District of 
Columbia for hijacking and, within hours of the arrest, had formally 
requested his extradition to the U.S.283 
The Reagan administration had a special interest in bringing 
Hamadei to justice in the U.S. because it had made antiterrorism a 
cornerstone of its foreign policy, strenuously arguing that terrorists 
should be caught, tried and sentenced like common criminals.284 The 
theory behind the antiterrorism stance was that the international com-
munity should cooperate to bring terrorists to justice; to successfully 
extradite Hamadei to the U.S. would back those words with action.285 
By working in cooperation with West Germany, the Reagan administra-
tion would project a united antiterrorist front to the rest ofthe world.286 
As a U.S. Attorney explained, "We had this horrible crime, we had 
terrific evidence, we had an overreaching American interest .... We 
were ready."287 By making an example of Hamadei, the U.S. hoped to 
drive other European countries to action.288 Prior to the hijacking, the 
Reagan Administration felt that many European countries wanted to 
avoid, instead of defy, terrorist threats.289 
Lying beneath the international cooperative aspects of the expected 
extradition was a more selfish reason for wanting to try Hamadei in a 
U.S. court: Washington viewed the hijacking as a direct attack on the 
U .S.290 Not only was a U.S. Navy diver killed, but the airline was Ameri-
can, American passengers were separated from travelers from other 
countries and beaten, and the terrorists seemed to have targeted 
American military personneP9] Witnesses later testified that the hijack-
ers planned to kill all of the American servicemen they could find. 292 
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At first Germany seemed as eager as the U.S. to have Hamadei tried 
in America; officials in the GermanJustice Ministry urged Washington 
to file an extradition request as soon as possible.293 The U.S was willing 
to waive the possibility of giving Hamadei the death penalty and 
Stephen Trott, the Associate Attorney General, signed off on the assur-
ance.294 In reality, there was no other choice short of abduction.295 
German law forbade extradition of a suspect who faced the death 
penalty and the U.S.-West German extradition treaty reflected that 
policy.296 
The process took an abrupt turn four days after Hamadei's capture, 
when two West German citizens were kidnapped in Beirut.297 The 
kidnappers demanded that the West German government refuse the 
U.S. extradition request and release Hamadei in exchange for the 
release of the captives.29B The German government attempted to deter-
mine whether there would be a substantial chance of preserving the 
lives of the hostages without appearing to give in to the demands of 
the terrorists if the extradition were refused.299 The Germans seized on 
to a principle articulated in the U.s.-West German treaty called aut 
dedere aut indicare or "either extradite or try. "300 By trying Hamadei in 
a West German court, the West German government felt that it could 
refrain from offending the U.S., while not appearing to bend com-
pletely to the wishes of the terrorists.30l West German Government 
lawyers also feared that a West German· court might find that 
Hamadei's crime constituted a political act for the purposes of the 
extradition treaty; if so, they would not even have had the option of 
extradition under the political exception rule of extradition treaties.302 
The U.S. obviously favored a hard line approach against the de-
mands of the terrorists, because the Reagan administration advocated 
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nonsubmission to any demands made by hostage takers.303 The official 
U.S. position was that the administration sympathized with West Ger-
many's position, and would understand if they chose not to extradite 
Hamadei.304 The U.S. Government's acceptance of West Germany's 
decision was made easier because the U.S. believed that West Ger-
many's action was legal under the 1970 Hague Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, to which both countries 
were parties.305 The Convention required each contracting State to take 
such measures as were necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the 
relevant offense when the alleged offender was present in its territory 
and when it did not extradite him to another State which had jurisdic-
tion over the case.306 As an epilogue to the case, Hamadei was sen-
tenced to life in prison by a division of the Landgericht Frankfurt 
Court in 1990.307 
4. Benjamin Sheinbein 
The Sheinbein case is slightly different from the other cases outlined 
in this note because the U.S. blatantly used political and monetary 
pressure against the requested country, instead of relying heavily on 
legal arguments in order to gain the extradition of the suspect. Ben-
jamin Sheinbein was suspected of killing, dismembering, and then 
burning an acquaintance of his on September 19, 1997, in Silver 
Spring, Maryland.308 The badly burned torso of Alfredo Enrique Tello, 
minus his arms and legs, was found wrapped in a garbage bag in the 
garage of a vacant house in Silver Spring.3og Police speculated that 
Sheinbein, Tello, and a third youth named Aaron Needle had an 
immature relationship filled with racial epithets and brawling that may 
have escalated into the murder.310 Sheinbein and Needle were longtime 
friends and schoolmates who often used drugs together; Tello began 
to associate with them during the summer of 1997.311 
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Before Sheinbein and Needle were indicted for Tello's murder, 
Sheinbein fled the country for Israel.~12 Needle is currently being held 
without bail in the county jail in Rockville, Maryland. 313 
Under Israeli law, its citizens cannot be extradited for any crime. c114 
Although Shein be in claims to be an Israeli citizen, one reason why the 
Sheinbein case has raised the ire of important members of Congress 
is because his Israeli citizenship argument is superficial at best.315 She-
inbein, born in the U.S., claims that he is an Israeli citizen because his 
father was born in pre-state Palestine in 1944 and left Israel in 1950.316 
Interestingly, when Sheinbein's father was seeking U.S. citizenship, he 
wrote "stateless" on the form asking for his family's citizenship.317 In 
addition, his father never registered himself or Shein be in as an Israeli 
citizen at the Israeli consulate as required by Israeli law.3ls 
When, after receiving the official request, Israel balked at immedi-
ately extraditing Sheinbein, U.S. newspapers and politicians vented 
their frustration publicly by lambasting Israel.319 Israeli Prime minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu wrote U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright 
stating that ifit became evident that Sheinbein could not be extradited, 
then Israel would try him for the murder. 320 In response, a Baltimore 
newspaper chided Sheinbein for suddenly developing an interest in 
his Israeli heritage and lashed out at Israel for refusing to extradite 
the suspect.321 Of more importance to Israel, Robert Livingston, Chair-
man of the U.S. House of Representatives Appropriations Committee, 
called Israel's action an outrage and threatened to link the continu-
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ance of the annual three billion dollars in American aid to Israel on 
Sheinbein's extradition.~22 
On December 6, 1997, Israel's Attorney General asked the court 
hearing the Sheinbein case to extradite the suspect to the U.S.323 The 
Israeli Attorney General was "widely attacked" in Israel for having 
developed a sensitivity to American political pressure and basing his 
opinion on the need to placate American public opinion.324 The actual 
extradition hearing began on February 22, 1998, before a three judge 
panel in Jerusalem.325 On September 6, 1998, Israeli Judge Moshe 
Ravid ruled that Sheinbein should be extradited to the U.S. to stand 
trial for the murder. 326 Judge Ravid partially accepted Sheinbein's citi-
zenship claim but found that under Israeli extradition law, an Israeli 
citizen is defined as someone who has the status of an Israeli citizen 
and who has a connection to the country.327 Technically, the ruling 
meant that Sheinbein qualified as an Israeli citizen but had no right 
to remain in the country because he had not maintained close ties to 
IsraeP28 Israeli legal scholars have called the ruling revolutionary, 
citing the fact that it creates a new legal definition of Israeli citizenship 
by adding another element of linkage to the country in order for 
someone to claim immunity from extradition.:12!l 
Sheinbein's attorneys brought the appeal before the Israeli Supreme 
Court on November 15, 1998, arguing that there is only one grade of 
Israeli citizenship, and that the law states clearly that Israeli citizens 
cannot be extradited. 330 Given the "revolutionary" reasoning of the 
lower court it was not surprising that the Israeli Supreme Court over-
turned the decision and blocked the extradition of Sheinbein.331 The 
majority opinion stated that, "no further affinity with Israel is required 
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for the appellant to be considered an Israeli citizen."332 The Israeli 
government moved swiftly in an attempt to soften the blow to the 
United States.333 Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's spokesman, 
Aviv Bushinsky, offered, "We ... are confident that the United States, 
as an enlightened country of law, will accept the Israeli Supreme 
Court's decision. "334 
Israeli Justice Ministry officials added that Sheinbein would be in-
dicted in Israel on the same charges, and in the mean time, remain in 
detention.335 The U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv has refused comment on the 
decision.336 
. CONCLUSION 
The rash of extradition controversies in recent years involving high 
profile murder cases seems to have caused escalating frustration for 
American law enforcement officials and politicians. The resentment 
that comes with watching a foreign court deny the U.S. the chance to 
try an American citizen for killing another American citizen on Ameri-
can soil, as in the Einhorn case, may cause the U.S. to increasingly seek 
abduction or informal surrender of the suspect as viable alternatives 
to formal extradition. If the U.S. judiciary continues to uniformly apply 
the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, the only restraint on law enforcement officials 
will be the possible foreign policy implications of ignoring other coun-
tries' territorial sovereignty. Another possible alternative to formal 
extradition is for the U.S. to apply pressure on the requested country 
in an effort to influence the country's executive branch or judiciary. 
In the Sheinbein case, U.S. politicians were not above blatantly threat-
ening Israel with severe cuts in aid if the case was not decided in a 
satisfactory manner. 
With the global trend toward abolition of the death penalty and the 
growing acceptance of international human rights, the U.S. can con-
tinue to expect collisions with other countries' territorial sovereignty 
as it pursues murderers around the world. Mter Soering and its prog-
eny, it has become apparent that human rights courts are willing to 
engage in fact-specific, substantive reviews of the U.S. penal system. 
Fact-specific inquiries by the courts lend an air of unpredictability to 
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the outcomes of the cases, which will only add to the tension which 
always surrounds an extradition request for a murderer. The question 
will become whether or not the U.s. is willing to risk the foreign policy 
implications of abducting or arranging deals with other countries to 
insure a murder trial in the u.s. 
Matthew W Henning 
